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The United States Supreme Court has intervened more actively and more decisively in the 
regulation of campaign finance than in any other aspect of the political process, excepting only 
legislative districting. Yet, prior to the enactment of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA) amendments, the Court had gone to great lengths to avoid deciding whether or to what 
extent the Constitution protects the raising and spending of money in election campaigns. 
Prior to the 1970's, regulation of campaign finance consisted primarily of (1) prohibition of 
campaign contributions by corporations and labor unions (largely ineffective), and (2) disclosure 
requirements and limits on spending (totally ineffective). Federal election laws, particularly those 
restricting labor unions, were challenged repeatedly, but in each case the Supreme Court dodged the 
constitutional question. United States v. CIO (1948); United States v. UAW-CIO (1957); Pipe.fitters 
v. United States (1972).
In 1971, Congress enacted the original FECA. Although this Act contained several novel 
provisions, only newly-strengthened disclosure requirements were destined to go into effect. The 
Nixon reelection committee's scramble to raise money prior to the effective date of these 
requirements constituted a major element of the Watergate scandal, which in tum prompted 
Congress to enact the 1974 FECA amendments. 
In addition to the disclosure requirements, the amended PECA limited the amount that could 
be spent in campaigns for federal office; limited the size of contributions to federal candidates 
($5,000 for contributions by "multiple-candidate committees," more popularly known as political 
action committees, or PAC's; larger amounts for political party organizations; and $1,000 for other 
organizations and for individuals); limited the amount that candidates could spend from their 
personal funds in their own behalf; limited amounts that could be spent independently to support or 
oppose a federal candidate; and provided for public financing of presidential campaigns. The 
prohibition of contributions and expenditures by corporations and labor unions was carried over 
from previous law. Finally, the 1974 amendments created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
to administer the Act. 
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Buckley v. Valeo 
Congress has made relatively minor adjustments, but since 1974, the direction of change in 
campaign finance regulation has been set primarily by the Supreme Court. The first and still the 
most important campaign finance decision was Buckley v. Valeo (1976). In sharp contrast to its 
earlier efforts to avoid constitutional decision-making regarding campaign finance, in Buckley the 
Court was willing to consider every challenge presented against the FECA. This was all the more 
striking given the abstract setting, none of the provisions under challenge having yet undergone the 
practical test of being applied in an election. 
The resulting treatise in the guise of a judicial opinion was prepared under unusual time 
pressure, resulting from the perceived need to decide the case in time to permit the candidates in the 
1976 election to know the ground rules, and to permit the public financing machinery to go into 
effect. Running to 138 pages, Buckley is probably the longest per curiam decision in the Court's 
history. (This is the term used to describe an opinion "by the Court," i.e., not signed by any one 
Justice. Appendices, notes, and separate opinions by five Justices, each of whom dissented from one 
or another portion of the per curiam decision, brought the grand total to 294 pages.) 
One portion of Buckley required a restructuring of the FEC, on grounds that as originally 
constituted it violated the principle of separation of powers. Beyond this, and despite vigorous 
argument to the contrary from defenders of the legislation (Wright, 1976), Buckley established that 
regulation of the contributing and spending of money in election campaigns affects rights of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. Such regulation is therefore subject to judicial 
review, although it will be upheld if the govermnent's reasons for regulating are sufficient. The 
Court's campaign finance doctrine, as laid down in Buckley and in subsequent cases -- the limits 
within which the Court will permit regulation of campaign finance at the federal, state, and local 
levels -- may be stated fairly simply, though there remain some unanswered questions and, as is 
usually the case with constitutional doctrine, even the answers that have been provided are subject to 
change. 
Provisions that do not directly restrict the flow of campaign money -- in particular, 
disclosure requirements ar-id public financing of election campaigns -- are relatively free of 
constitutional limitation. The Court did express a willingness in Buckley, and acted upon it in 
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee (1982), to intervene when there is a concrete 
showing that such provisions impose serious hardships on third parties or independent candidates. 
This has not prevented some cormnentators (e.g., Nicholson, 1977) from criticizing the Court for 
insufficient protection of minor candidacies. So far as non-restrictive campaign finance provisions 
affect the major parties, the Court has given Congress and the state legislatures a free hand. 
Contribution and Expenditure Limits 
In the case of direct restrictions on the flow of campaign money, the Court has relied on 
what the majority of the Justices have seen as three sharp distinctions. The first and most 
fundamental, originating in Buckley, differentiates between restrictions on expenditures and 
restrictions on contributions. The Buckley Court stated that limits on the size of contributions were 
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permissible so long as they could be justified as measures to prevent corruption or the appearance of 
corruption. On this basis, the contribution limits in the 1974 FECA amendments were upheld. 
Expenditure limits were struck down across the board -- not only the overall campaign spending 
limits, which were said to be redundant of the contribution limits so far as the prevention of 
corruption is concerned, but also the limits on spending of candidates' personal funds and on 
independent spending. 
Limits on contributions were found in Buckley to restrict rights of association protected by 
the First Amendment, but limits on expenditures were a direct restriction of speech, and therefore 
more suspect. In comparison with the spending of money in a campaign, a contribution was merely 
"speech by proxy," as Justice Thurgood Marshall later said (California Medical Assn. v. Federal 
Election Commission, 1981). The Court dismissed rather casually the objection that a candidate's 
ability to spend, and therefore under the Court's premises, to speak, would be limited to the extent 
contribution restrictions limited his or her ability to raise funds. In addition to their lesser 
infringement on First Amendment rights, contribution limits were favored by the Court relative to 
spending limits because they limit undue influence of large contributors over public officials. 
Informed observers have disagreed about the seriousness of corruption resulting from 
campaign contributions (compare, e.g., Sorauf, 1988, at 307-17, with Drew, 1983). The electoral 
advantage that derives from the ability to raise large amounts of money is complex but real 
(Jacobson, 1980). Accordingly, those who would deny the pressure that campaign contributors can 
bring to bear on officials must maintain either that officials are indifferent to their prospects for 
reelection, or that they consistently set aside their political ambitions when engaging in their official 
activities. Generally, political science has proceeded on opposite assumptions (e.g., Mayhew, 1974). 
In any event, the Buckley Court sought to avoid this question by asserting that it would be sufficient 
justification for contribution limits that they avoid the mere appeatance of undue influence. 
In contrast, the Buckley majority maintained, the various expenditure limits could not be 
justified as anti-corruption measures. This was clearest in the case of limits on spending of 
candidates' personal funds. The majority did not entertain the suggestion that such a limit might 
overcome the unfair advantage contribution limits give to a wealthy candidate whose less fortunate 
opponents must raise funds in smali increments. 
The anti-corruption potential of limits on independent spending was more controversial. 
Supporters of FECA had regarded these limits as a corollary to the contribution limits, but the 
Buckley Court maintained that independent spending did not have the same potential as contributions 
for undue influence. The Court's observation that spending uncoordinated with the candidate's own 
campaign may not be helpful to the candidate is true but of dubious relevance, since the reformers 
were concerned about influence in the cases where the independent spending is helpful. The Court's 
argument that corruption was unlikely because by definition the independent spender was not able to 
consult with the candidate in advance is also flawed, since corrupt influence is possible without any 
advance agreement (Lowenstein, 1985). 
w-natever the merits of the Court's logic, it is doubtful that widespread independent 
spending has been used as a means of evading the contribution limits, as some reformers had feared. 
True, the success attributed to conservative independent spending committees in defeating several 
incumbent Democratic Senators in the 1978 and 1980 elections stimulated controversy and renewed 
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attempts to establish the validity of regulating at least some independent spending. However, these 
committees were more ideological than interest-based, and their money came primarily from small 
contributors. Concern over the issue subsided after most of the incumbents targeted by the 
conservative committees in the 1982 elections were reelected, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
immunity of independent spending from limitation in 1985 (FEC v. National Conservative Political 
Action Committee) (NCPAC). 
Independent spending is unlikely to reemerge as a major consitutional issue until and unless 
business and professional groups tum to independent spending in behalf of candidates as a means of 
gaining influence over elected officials. Significant subsidiary questions, especially regarding how 
much coordination with the candidate's campaign may exist before spending loses its character as 
"independent" and is treated as an in-kind contribution subject to limitation, have gone unresolved, 
primarily because of the FEC's passive enforcement policies. 
Finally, the Court found that overall limits on how much a candidate's campaign could 
spend were unnecessary for the prevention of conuption or its appearance. Congress had limited 
contributions to a size that would pose no such danger, the Court reasoned. Given such limits, the 
ability of a candidate to raise large amounts of campaign funds would reflect widespread support, 
rather than posing a danger of undue influence. 
The Court's reasoning fails to recognize that Congress had to trade off conflicting goals 
when it enacted and amended the FECA. Contribution limits could not be set single-mindedly with 
the intent of preventing the possibility of conupt influence, because setting the limits too low might 
make it impossible for candidates to mount sufficient campaigns (Note, 1978, at 461 n.52). 
Contribution limits would prevent the most flagrant instances of conuption, but expenditure limits 
would eliminate the need for candidates to raise large amounts, and thereby reduce the pressure 
deriving from contributions generally and from any particular contribution. 
Despite its assertions that expenditure limits infringed greatly on First Amendment freedoms 
and served no legitimate purpose, the Buckley Court added in a footnote that the government could 
validly require that a candidate accepting public financing agree to limit his or her overall campaign 
spending (424 U.S. at 51 n.65). The Court offered no explanation of why, if expenditure limits were 
so grave an intrusion against freedom of speech a.1d so iacking in justification, their imposition was 
not an unconstitutional condition on receipt of public financing 01 an Alstyne, 1968). Perhaps some 
members of the Court hoped that in order to preserve spending limits, Congress would adopt public 
financing in House and Senate races. If so, these hopes have not come to fruition. Political 
scientists have found that challengers tend to gain relative to incumbents as more money is spent in a 
campaign (Jacobson, 1980). By prohibiting spending limits in the absence of public financing, the 
Court, purposefully or not, may have deprived incumbent legislators of one potent means of 
guaranteeing their own self-preservation. 
Ballot Measure Elections 
The second of the major distinctions the Court has drawn in campaign finance cases is that 
between elections for public office and ballot measure elections. Buckley was limited to the former, 
since the statute under challenge, the FECA, applied only to federal elections, while ballot measure 
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elections occur only at the state and local levels. Nevertheless, many states and localities have 
applied their campaign finance restrictions to ballot measure elections, and these were brought 
before the Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) and Citizens Against Rent 
Control v. Berkeley (1981) (CARC). 
Bellotti was a challenge to a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from 
contributing to certain ballot measure campaigns (Schneider, 1986), and CARC to a local ordinance 
limiting to $250 the contributions that anyone could make to a ballot measure campaign committee 
(Nicholson, 1981). Despite the favorable reception given by the Court to contribution restrictions in 
Buckley and in California Medical Association, the restrictions in both Bellotti and CARC were 
struck down. 
The infringement of First Amendment interests resulting from restricting contributions to 
ballot measures is neither greater nor less than when contributions to candidates are limited. 
Therefore, the results in Bellotti and CARC must be explained on the basis of the strength of the 
state's interest in imposing the restrictions. In Buckley, the Court had upheld the restrictions as a 
means to avoid corruption or undue influence on elected officials. The same state interest could not 
be asserted in Bellotti and CARC, since there was no candidate to be corrupted. 
The argument in favor of controlling contributions in ballot measure elections is that the 
political system is distorted, if not "corrupted," not only when undue pressure is brought to bear on 
candidates via campaign contributions, but also when enormous corporate contributions, unrelated to 
any widespread popular support for the corporate position, can skew election results by sponsoring 
an unfair and one-sided public debate. The Court proved unreceptive to this sort of argument in 
Bellotti and CARC, but hedged its position by relying in part on the lack of evidence in the record of 
each case that any such skewing actually exists. Precisely what evidence, if any, could have 
persuaded the majority in Bellotti or CARC to uphold the restrictions is uncertain (Shockley, 1985), 
but some research suggests that one-sided spending resulting from corporate contributions in certain 
ballot measure elections, especially in opposition to measures, can be extremely potent (Shockley, 
1980; Lowenstein, 1982). 
Restrictions on Corporations 
The third and last major distinction in the Court's campaign finance doctrine emerged later 
than those between expenditure and contribution limits and between candidate and ballot measure 
elections. In recent cases, the Court has made it clear that restrictions may be imposed on business 
corporations that would not be permitted against individuals or other kinds of organizations. 
It is true that in Bellotti, the Court had upheld restrictions applicable only to corporations. 
Confronted with the assertion that corporations are not protected by the freedom of speech guarantee 
of the first amendment, the majority responded, somewhat evasively, that it was sufficient that the 
speech itself was directed to current political issues and deserved protection. Relying on the 
distinction between ballot measures and elections for public office, the majority stated it was not 
ruling on the validity of bans on corporate participation in elections for public office (Bellotti, n.26). 
The Court first confronted the latter question in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee 
(1982), in which it upheld the federal prohibition on corporate contributions. As in Buckley and 
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California Medical Association, the Court relied on the government's purpose of preventing corrupt 
influence. 
More far-reaching in its implications was FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (1986) 
(MCFL), which involved the federal prohibition of independent spending by corporations. The 
Court previously had barred limits on non-corporate independent spenders, even in behalf of a 
candidate who accepts public financing (NCPAC). Tue independent spender in MCFL was a non­
profit corporation fanned primarily for the purpose of political advocacy. Tue Court held that 
independent spending by such a group was protected by the Constitution. This holding in itself was 
unremarkable, although four justices dissented from it. More significant was an extended dictum in 
which the majority stated that the prohibition of independent spending would be upheld as applied to 
business corporations operated for profit. 
We may now summarize the Court's current campaign finance doctrine, bearing in mind the 
three major distinctions around which it has been organized: 
I. Nonrestrictive interventions into the campaign finance system, such as disclosure 
requirements and public financing, are valid except to the extent they are shown concretely 
to prejudice seriously the interests of third parties or independent candidates. 
2. Limits on the size of contributions to candidates for public office are generally
valid, if they can be justified reasonably as efforts to prevent undue influence of officials or 
the appearance of such undue influence. 
3. Subject to the single exception in the next paragraph, all limits on spending in
connection with elections for public office are unconstitutional. This applies to overall 
campaign expenditures, independent spending in behalf of a candidate, and spending of the 
candidate's own money in his or her behalf. 
4. Restrictions on spending in behalf of candidates by business corporations 
operated for profit are constitutional. 
5. In ballot measure campaigns, limits on both contributions and expenditures, even 
those of business corporations, are unconstitutional in the absence of a showing, the 
requirements of which are vaguely defined, that the practices in question jeopardize the 
democratic process. 
Unanswered Questions 
As major areas of constitutional law go, doctrine in the campaign finance area is thus 
reasonably well elaborated, whatever may be said for or against the doctrine as a matter of logic or 
policy. Nevertheless, a number of questions remain. Among the more important issues likely to be 
presented to the Court in the foreseeable future are the following: 
I. Will the Courf s tolerance for regulation of campaign finance activity by corporations be 
extended to labor unions? Much of the Court's rationale for singling out corporations is either 
inapplicable to unions, or applicable to them to a much lesser extent. For example, inMCFL the 
majority relied in part on "the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be 
used to provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace." Tue same prospect does not exist 
in the case of unions, especially since the Court does not permit the union dues of objecting 
7 
members to be used for political purposes (Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 1977). 
Furthermore, it is feasible for affluent corporate managers to make substantial political contributions 
as individuals, while union members may need the collective vehicle of the union if they are to 
contribute effectively at all. 
On the other hand, it has been the tradition for half a century at the federal level and in many 
states to apply similar restrictions to corporations and unions. Constitutionally mandated differential 
treatment may be perceived as unfairly favoring the economic and ideological position of labor 
against that of business. In addition, many would regard it as unfair from a partisan standpoint to 
provide constitutional protection to the political activity of a traditionally Democratic group while 
withdrawing such protection from a more Republican group. 
2. Will the Court permit "aggregate" contribution limits? In recent years reform proposals
have sought to restrict the aggregate amount a candidate may accept from sources or in amounts 
likely to represent "special interests." These may be defined variously as contributions from PAC's, 
from any source other than an individual, or from any source in an amount above a specified figure. 
Aggregate contribution limits may be vulnerable to constitutional attack on the theory that 
once the recipient has reached the limit, new would-be contributors are completely barred from 
contributing, rather than merely being limited in amount. Furthermore, the connection between an 
aggregate contribution limit and the amount the candidate can spend might seem more direct to the 
Court than in the case of the individual contribution limits that were upheld in Buckley. 
Nevertheless, where public financing and the concomitant possibility of expenditure limits 
are not politically feasible, aggregate contribution limits may be the only effective means of limiting 
political pressures generated by campaign financing. Their constitutional prospects may be 
enhanced by the fact that in fonn, at least, they are contribution limits rather than expenditure limits, 
and that only specified types of contributions come within the aggregate limits. The possibility of a 
candidate with widespread support spending an unlimited amount is therefore retained. 
3. What are the limits on the incentives that ma:y be created to induce candidates to accept
spending limits "voluntarily"? In Buckley, as we have seen, the Court offered no explanation for its 
conclusion that expenditure limits could be imposed on a candidate as a condition of his or her 
accepting public financing. This lack of explanation makes it especially difficuli to predict whether 
additional incentives for the voluntary acceptance of spending limits would be acceptable. For 
example, would it be constitutional to impose contribution limits, but waive them for Candidate A if 
his or her opponent, Candidate B, refused to agree to spending limits? The "benefit" offered to 
Candidate B on the condition of assent to expenditure limits would consist not of public funding, but 
of the imposition of a limitation on Candidate A. If such an arrangement were unconstitutional, 
would the result change if by agreeing to the expenditure limits, Candidate B would receive public 
financing in addition to contribution limits being made applicable to Candidate A? 
Elected legislators tend to favor expenditure limits, and particularly fear possible opponents 
who can spend unlimited amounts from their own personal funds. Given the reluctance of 
legislatures to adopt public financing, or if they adopt it to fund it to the point that they can be 
confident all candidates will accept it, it is likely that experimental new incentives to accept 
spending limits will arise, and sooner or later will be tested in the Supreme Court. 
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Competing Visions 
In addition to noting the existence of these and other unanswered questions, one may 
question the long-tenu stability of the Court's campaign finance doctrine. The three central 
distinctions upon which the Court has relied have generated answers to the questions the Court has 
had to decide, but none of them have such far-reaching validity that they easily support the weight 
the Court has placed on them. 
Thus, the Court's distinction between contribution limits and expenditure limits is supported 
by recognition that contributions are the direct source of the political pressure that the regulator 
seeks to control, while the expenditure is directly associated with the political expression that the 
civil libertarian seeks to protect. Nevertheless, neither contributions nor expenditures have meaning 
without regard to the other. It is the need or the desire to spend that creates the demand for 
contributions. So long as we continue to finance campaigns privately, we cannot enjoy the benefit of 
unlimited speech without the social cost of considerable corrupt influence, and we cannot 
substantially control corrupt influence without some limits on speech. 
The distinction between elections for public office and elections on ballot propositions holds 
up if the only concern is corruption defined narrowly as unacceptable influence on public officials 
derived from campaign contributions. The distinction breaks down when the concern is broadened 
to include broad structural inequality in influence over the political process, especially given that the 
main purpose for adopting the initiative process in many states during the Progressive Era was to 
provide ordinary citizens with a device for overcoming the perceived domination of legislatures by 
special interests. 
Finally, the business corporation is the paradigm of massive financial resources accumulated 
for non-political and non-ideological purposes, whose infusion into election campaigns may bear 
little relation to the distribution or intensity of political support. Nevertheless, while it stands at one 
end of the spectrum in this regard, it is not sharply separated from other political contributors and 
spenders. Contributions by individuals give disproportionate influence to the affluent, and even 
non-corporate groups that are well organized, such as unions and professional and trade groups, have 
an advantage over reiativeiy unorganized groups, such as ordinary taxpayers, consumers, and the 
poor. 
Some observers have regarded the campaign finance controversy as reflecting two competing 
visions of the government's rights and obligations with respect to the political process. (Polsby, 
1976; Fiss, 1986). In one vision, emphasis is placed on the individual's or group's right to be free 
from government interference with political participation. Vast inequalities in resources that may be 
available for such participation, by reason of unequal distribution of wealth or of relative structural 
advantages and disadvantages in the ability of different interests to organize, are either regarded as 
benign or accepted as the possibly unavoidable cost of protecting rights of speech and association. 
In the opposing vision, the right to political participation may be infringed not only by 
government suppression but also by structural inequalities in access to the resources that are 
necessary for effective participation. In this vision, government intervention to offset such 
inequalities is penuissible if not obligatory, because an individual's or group's good fortune in the 
economic sector does not create a right to a corresponding advantage in the political sector. 
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Though these visions are largely incompatible with each other, each plainly has substantial 
grounding in American political thought and practice. Buckley v. Valeo and other of the Supreme 
Court's earlier campaign finance decisions may be seen as an attempt to impose a moderate version 
of the first vision. Inequality of political resources could be assuaged only by non-restrictive 
measures or as a by-product of regulations aimed at unethical methods of exercising influence. Even 
these approaches were qualified by the right to deploy economic or organizational advantages to gain 
political influence. 
Viewed from this perspective, MCFL may represent a major departure from the earlier 
campaign finance cases (Nicholson, 1987-88). Statements in that decision that "concern over the 
corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to 
protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas" do more than underscore the Court's 
distinction between corporations and other types of contributors and spenders. In the context of a 
case involving independent spending, the Court's use of the term "integrity" goes beyond concern 
for unethical practices. Rather, the term expresses a systemic concern that elections not be 
dominated by those whose overwhelming resources "are not an indication of popular support" for 
their political ideas. 
Ideological movement by the Court along the path suggested by the language of MCFL 
could upset existing campaign finance doctrine. Bellotti's holding that states may not regulate 
corporate participation in ballot measure elections seems most vulnerable. So long as the issue was 
corruption, narrowly conceived, the Court could distinguish corporate participation in ballot 
propositions from elections for public office. If the issue is domination of the process by wealth 
unrelated to public support, the distinction vanishes. 
The Court is not likely ever to accept fully and permanently one of the competing visions 
described above to the exclusion of the other. MCFL suggests some movement away from the 
laissez-faire end of the spectrum towards toleration of some affirmative government action in 
pursuance of more equal political participation. The extent and duration of that movement cannot be 
predicted. 
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